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Abstract
There is ongoing debate about the extent to which nonhuman animals, like humans, can go beyond first-order perceptual 
information to abstract structural information from their environment. To provide more empirical evidence regarding this 
question, we examined what type of information great apes (chimpanzees, bonobos, and orangutans) gain from optical 
effects such as shadows and mirror images. In an initial experiment, we investigated whether apes would use mirror images 
and shadows to locate hidden food. We found that all examined ape species used these cues to find the food. Follow-up 
experiments showed that apes neither confused these optical effects with the food rewards nor did they merely associate cues 
with food. First, naïve chimpanzees used the shadow of the hidden food to locate it but they did not learn within the same 
number of trials to use a perceptually similar rubber patch as indicator of the hidden food reward. Second, apes made use of 
the mirror images to estimate the distance of the hidden food from their own body. Depending on the distance, apes either 
pointed into the direction of the food or tried to access the hidden food directly. Third, apes showed some sensitivity to the 
geometrical relation between mirror orientation and mirrored objects when searching hidden food. Fourth, apes tended to 
interpret mirror images and pictures of these mirror images differently depending on their prior knowledge. Together, these 
findings suggest that apes are sensitive to the optical relation between mirror images and shadows and their physical referents.
Keywords Primate cognition · Causal cognition · Intuitive physics · Problem solving · Appearance-reality discrimination · 
Secondary representations
Introduction
A central debate in the field of comparative cognition is to 
what extent nonhuman animals go beyond the perceptual 
input to discriminate between appearance and reality (e.g., 
Carruthers 2008; Krachun et al. 2009) and to abstract higher-
order relations (Penn et al. 2008). This is a pivotal question 
that transcends different areas of research including picture 
recognition (e.g., Fagot et al. 2010), object permanence 
(e.g., Jaakkola 2014), and causal cognition (e.g. Penn and 
Povinelli 2007). Suddendorf and Whiten (2001; follow-
ing Perner 1991) proposed that secondary representations 
underlie each of these mental abilities in young children and 
nonhuman great apes (henceforth apes). Secondary repre-
sentations, in contrast to primary representations that serve 
to directly model the current environment, involve a decou-
pling from the here and now. An important property of these 
secondary representations is that they enable organisms to 
integrate past knowledge and hypothetical scenarios with 
current perceptual information.
Appearance-reality (henceforth AR) discrimination tasks 
have been used in developmental and comparative studies 
to directly examine the ability to integrate current percep-
tual information with prior knowledge. In nonverbal AR 
discrimination tasks, individuals are usually presented first 
with all the relevant information (e.g., the true size of two 
different food items) that they need to make an informed 
decision (e.g., pick the larger of the two items). Thereaf-
ter, the appearance of the items is manipulated such that 
the preferred item now looks like the less-preferred one and 
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vice versa. The appearance is altered, for example, by means 
of partial occlusion, magnifying and minimizing lenses, or 
colour filters. To pass these tests, subjects need to discount 
the currently misleading information and adhere to the pre-
vious information about the true item properties. Human 
children pass nonverbal AR tasks from about 2.5–3 years 
of age (Karg et al. 2014; Sapp et al. 2000). Apes have also 
mastered various versions of the AR discrimination task. 
Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) selected large grapes over 
small ones even when the large grapes at the time of choice 
appeared to be small (placed behind a minimizing lens) and 
the small ones appeared to be large (placed behind a magni-
fying lens; Krachun et al. 2009, 2016). Likewise, bonobos 
(Pan paniscus), chimpanzees, gorillas (Gorilla gorilla), and 
orangutans (Pongo abelii) used prior information about the 
length of two different pretzel sticks to select the longer one 
even when the pretzel sticks were covered partially such that 
the large stick appeared to be smaller than the short one 
before apes were allowed to choose (Karg et al. 2014).
In the most recent contribution, Krachun et al. (2016) 
presented chimpanzees with mirror images, which created 
the illusion of doubling the amount of available food. In 
particular, chimpanzees were presented with two open boxes 
in which different food quantities were placed. While the 
subjects were watching, a mirror was inserted in the box 
containing fewer food items, which doubled the perceived 
number of food items in this box. Three out of six chimpan-
zees passed this test by choosing the box without the mirror 
that appeared to contain fewer grapes but in reality contained 
more. One chimpanzee even passed a follow-up condition 
in which visual tracking was avoided by scrambling the two 
boxes out of sight. In this latter condition, subjects had to 
compare the perceived food quantities between the boxes 
after scrambling and select the apparently smaller quantity 
to obtain the larger one. The performance of this individual 
suggests that at least one chimpanzee can go beyond Pia-
getian conservation as she seemed to use the misleading 
appearance to identify a preferred reward instead of just 
ignoring the misleading appearance.
Krachun et al.’s (2016) study highlights the unique poten-
tial of mirrors for the investigation of AR discrimination. 
Standard plane mirrors reflect objects in the environment 
without significant distortions. It is, therefore, not surprising 
that mirror reflections can lead to misperceptions, for exam-
ple, about the location of an object (Loveland 1986). Never-
theless, there is evidence that some primate species do not 
confuse the location of mirror reflections with the location 
of their physical referents. For example, various primate spe-
cies are capable of using mirror images to locate otherwise 
nonvisible food items. Rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) 
learnt to use a mirror in a string-pulling paradigm to identify 
which of two strings was connected to a food reward (Brown 
et al. 1965). Even without explicit training, chimpanzees 
and Tonkean and long-tailed macaques (M. tonkeana and M. 
fascicularis) used mirror images to guide their hands toward 
a hidden food reward or colour mark (e.g., Anderson 1986; 
Menzel et al. 1985). In these studies, a large number of dif-
ferent target location was used. Chimpanzees also used a live 
video stream to guide their hands to the colour mark, even 
when the video stream was laterally reversed and inverted, 
and they discriminated between two screens showing either 
the live stream or the recorded images from previous ses-
sions. When the screen was switched off at the beginning 
of control trials, the chimpanzees stopped reaching for the 
target immediately and only continued their search when the 
screen was switched on again (Menzel et al. 1985).
Self-recognition studies provide additional evidence that 
some primate species, in particular great apes, do not con-
fuse mirror images with their referents. These studies show 
that apes show mirror-induced self-exploration without any 
explicit training (e.g., Gallup 1970; Köhler 1921; see also 
Anderson and Gallup 2015 for a recent review). A promi-
nent experimental paradigm in this context is the so-called 
mark test. Here, a colour mark is placed on a usually unseen 
body part of the subject. Importantly, the subjects are una-
ware of this mark. Subsequently, subjects are presented with 
their mirror image. They pass the mirror test if they explore 
the mark or try to remove it. Chimpanzees (P. troglodytes), 
orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), and gorillas (G. gorilla) have 
spontaneously passed the mark test (Anderson and Gallup 
2015). These findings, together with those on mirror-guided 
search, suggest that some primate species, in particular apes, 
do not confuse mirror and video images with their referents 
at least when they receive continuous visuomotor feedback.
Shadows are another optical phenomenon that can pro-
vide an interesting contrast when compared to mirror reflec-
tions. Shadows, like mirror reflections, are causally related 
to a physical referent, that is, to the object that is casting the 
shadow. Moreover, shadows also resemble their referents 
though to a lesser extent than mirror reflections. In other 
words, mirror reflections and shadows both convey (causal) 
information about an object (e.g., the object’s outline) but 
the risk of confusion with the object differs considerably 
between the two. If an individual uses both of these optical 
cues similarly to locate the referent, one might argue that it 
is not the perceptual resemblance with the referent that is 
key, but the causal relation between the cue and its referent.
Despite their frequent occurrence, there is very little 
research to date investigating the kind of information that 
primates are capable of extracting from shadows (e.g., about 
the location of objects). Presented with their own silhou-
ette cast on a wall, Guinea baboons (Papio papio) reacted 
aggressively in a few instances and there was no sign that 
they recognized their own shadow (Petit and Thierry 1994). 
Chimpanzees, in contrast, may relate their shadow to them-
selves, though the evidence to date is rather anecdotal. 
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Boysen et al. (1994) presented two juvenile, enculturated 
chimpanzees with different situations in which they could 
locate objects by means of their shadows and recognize their 
own shadow. For instance, chimpanzees watched shadow 
plays showing either how a ball was passed behind the back 
of the chimpanzees from one experimenter to the next or 
how a hat was raised behind the chimpanzees creating the 
impression that the shadow of the chimpanzee wore a hat. 
In the latter case, especially one of the two chimpanzees 
sometimes produced self-directed responses when she could 
see the hat on top of her silhouette (e.g., moving her head 
presumably to detach her own silhouette from the shadow of 
the hat). In the case of the object shadow-recognition task, 
none of the chimpanzees preferentially oriented toward the 
experimenter who held the ball after the transfer. In general, 
a base rate of the measured behaviours was missing and 
no statistical inference could be drawn from these results. 
Therefore, it remains inconclusive whether chimpanzees can 
infer the relation between shadows and their own body or 
other objects in their environment.
In the current study, we examined what kind of infor-
mation apes extracted from mirror images and shadows to 
locate hidden food items in space. First, we studied whether 
apes could estimate how far away an object was from their 
position based on a mirror image. Second, we tested whether 
apes were sensitive to the geometrical relation between the 
orientation of a mirror and the location of a reflected object. 
Third, we investigated what kind of cues apes used to recog-
nize whether they looked at a mirror (as compared to a static 
picture of the mirror image). Finally, we examined whether 
apes would take advantage of shadows to locate a hidden 
food reward paying particular attention to the different risk 
of confusion with the referent’s location between shadows 
and mirror images. The null hypothesis throughout the paper 
is that apes’ performance is governed by an associative, 
reinforcement-based learning mechanism. According to this 
associative account, the close spatial contingency between 
visual cues (i.e., the mirror image or projected shadow) and 
the concealed food reward is sufficient for individuals to 
learn over multiple trials to use this cue to locate the reward. 
Importantly, even rapid learning of new spatial associations 
would be limited to the perceptual qualities of the presented 
cues and not involve any causal understanding of the optical 
relations involved (e.g., regarding the geometrical relation 
between the location of the mirror image and its referent).
Experiment 1
In the first experiment, we investigated whether different 
ape species (chimpanzees, bonobos, and orangutans) would 
use mirror images and shadows to locate hidden food. We 
compared these cues to a baseline condition in which apes 
could see where the food was hidden and a control condi-
tion in which the apes did not receive any cue about the food 
location. We hypothesized that apes would perform signifi-
cantly better in the mirror and shadow condition compared 
to the control condition if they were sensitive to the relation 
between these optical effects and their physical referents 
(i.e., the desired food reward). Moreover, we expected a 
similar performance between the mirror and shadow condi-
tions and the visible displacement baseline condition.
Materials and methods
Subjects
Eleven chimpanzees (P. troglodytes), six orangutans (P. 
abelii), and eight bonobos (P. paniscus) participated in 
this experiment. The subjects were housed at the Wolfgang 
Köhler Research Centre, Leipzig Zoo (Leipzig, Germany). 
The subjects were not deprived of food, and water was avail-
able ad libitum during testing. One of the 11 chimpanzees 
(Jeudi) stopped approaching the test site after two sessions 
and was, therefore, excluded from data analysis. Another 
chimpanzee (Frodo) only completed the mirror condition but 
was not available for the shadow condition. Our final sample 
consisted of 16 females and 8 males aged between 5 and 
41 years (MAge 20.3 years). Subjects had participated in vari-
ous cognitive tasks prior to the study, none of which involv-
ing shadows or mirrors as source of information. All chim-
panzees and orangutans (but not the bonobos) had previous 
experience with shadows in a pilot experiment in which they 
failed to use the shadows as a cue (except for two chim-
panzees, Sandra and Jeudi, who scored significantly above 
chance at the individual level). In the pilot experiment, the 
hidden food reward was located on a transparent Plexiglas 
table and its shadow was projected to a surface underneath 
this table. In the current setup, the shadow of the reward 
was projected to a screen behind the hidden food reward in 
the apes’ line of sight. The individual performance in the 
shadow condition of Experiment 1 and 2 was not correlated 
with the performance in the pilot experiment (Spearman’s 
correlation: rs = 0.240, N = 23, p = 0.267). Additionally, the 
bonobos who did not participate in the pilot experiment per-
formed at similar levels compared to the other apes. Conse-
quently, carry-over effects from the pilot experiment appear 
unlikely.
Apparatus
The experimenter (E) sat behind the sliding platform 
(78.5 × 34 cm) facing the subject who was behind a trans-
parent acrylic glass panel. This panel contained two or 
three horizontally aligned, circular holes (6 cm). The slid-
ing platform was mounted 10.5 cm below the Plexiglas 
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panel to ensure that the subjects could see all relevant 
parts of the platform, particularly the mirrors and projec-
tion areas for the shadows. On top of the sliding platform, 
there was a movable displacement device, a piece of PVC 
plastic material (7 × 3 cm), that served to displace the food 
placed on top of it (see Fig. 1). E could move the displace-
ment device to the left or to the right side of the platform 
via a thin, transparent string (diameter 1 mm) attached to 
it. The two ends of the string were connected underneath 
the platform. E displaced the food by pulling the string 
underneath the platform, occluded from the subjects’ view. 
Thereby, the experimenter remained in a central position 
without leaning to the left or to the right. At the experi-
menter side of the platform, there was a screen mounted 
vertically to the platform (78 × 17 cm) onto which the 
shadows were cast (shadow condition) or the mirrors 
(15 × 15 cm) were attached (mirror condition). Three cov-
ers occluded the location of the food at the left, central, 
and right side of the platform (height × depth × width: 
6.5 cm × 24.5 cm × 22/26 cm). In the shadow condition, 
two battery-powered bicycle lights (single LED, 0.5 W, 
12 lx) were located under the left and right cover facing 
toward the screen onto which the shadows were cast. When 
the covers were in place, the subjects could still see the 
screen with the silhouette/mirror image in the back of the 
platform but not the food or the displacement device.
Design
We administered four different conditions: mirror, shadow, 
control, and baseline. In the mirror and shadows conditions, 
apes could use the mirror image and the shadow of the food, 
respectively, to locate the food (see Fig. 1a, b and Online 
Resource 2). In the control condition, apes did not receive 
any information about the location of the food (controlling 
for inadvertent cues that the subjects might pick up; see 
Fig. 1c) and in the baseline condition apes could directly 
observe how the food was moved under one of the two lat-
eral covers (visible displacement baseline; see Fig. 1d).
We divided our sample into two groups according to 
the order in which they received the mirror and shadow 
condition. The mirror-first group received the mirror con-
dition in the first four sessions and the shadow condition 
in the following four sessions, for the shadow-first group 
the order of conditions was reversed. Assignment to the 
groups was random except that we balanced the groups 
for age, sex, and species as much as possible (mirror-first 
group: MAge: 22.6 years, 7 females, 4 males; shadow-first 
group: MAge: 17.3 years, 9 females, 3 males). Three oran-
gutans who were in the mirror-first group received a differ-
ent experimental setup in the mirror condition (the sliding 
platform was mounted at a greater height from the floor). 
Due to this change in the setup, apes could barely see the 
(a) Mirror 
(b) Shadow 
(c) Control 
(d) Baseline 
(e) Arbitrary 
Fig. 1  Experiment 1 and 2: illustration of the different conditions 
from the subjects’ point of view. Experiment 1 includes conditions 
(a–d); Experiment 2 includes conditions (b–e). A piece of banana 
(yellow oval) is placed on a displacement device. In all conditions 
except for the baseline condition, the food reward is then concealed. 
A silhouette (shadow condition), mirror image (mirror condition), or 
a black rubber patch (arbitrary condition) indicates the location of the 
concealed food reward. The rubber patch is displaced by the experi-
menter (tan shape = experimenter’s hand). (Color figure online)
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food in the mirror when sitting in front of the Plexiglas 
panel. We repeated the mirror condition for these indi-
viduals after the shadow condition. Due to the deviation 
in procedure, we discarded the data of their first four ses-
sions in the mirror condition and re-assigned them to the 
shadow-first group.
We administered 12 trials per session, each including 
6 trials of the experimental condition (mirror or shadow), 
and 3 trials of the control and baseline condition. The 
reward was moved to the left in half of the trials and to the 
right in the other half. We pseudo-randomized the order of 
trials within a session with the restriction that the food was 
moved to the same side in no more than three consecutive 
trials. Moreover, subjects did not receive the same con-
dition in more than four consecutive trials. All subjects 
completed 8 sessions, for a total of 24 trials per condition.
Procedure
We tested subjects individually. At the beginning of each 
trial, E moved the displacement device in the centre of the 
platform. In the mirror condition, E then mounted two mir-
rors (via magnets) at the screen on the left and right side 
of the platform facing toward the subject. In the shadow 
condition, E placed two lights on the platform in front of 
the left and right hole of the Plexiglas panel facing towards 
the vertical partition in the back. In the baseline and con-
trol condition, there were neither lights nor mirrors. Then 
E put the left and right covers on the platform (covering 
the two lamps in the shadow condition) and positioned 
a piece of banana on top of the displacement device in 
the centre. E covered the reward (except for the baseline 
condition) by putting the central cover on the platform and 
pulled the reward either to the left or to the right side via 
a string underneath the platform. E then lifted the central 
cover revealing that the food reward was gone. E pushed 
the platform forward allowing subjects to make a choice 
by inserting their hands into one of the two outer holes in 
the panel (for a picture of the setup, see Online Resource 
1). E looked straight to the ground to avoid inadvertent 
cueing, while displacing the food until the subjects made 
their choice. Once the subjects had made their choice, E 
lifted the selected cover. If the choice was correct, the sub-
jects received the piece of banana underneath the chosen 
cover. If the choice was incorrect (i.e., no food under the 
cover), E showed the apes where the food was hidden and 
discarded the food in the food bucket underneath the plat-
form. In a few trials, apes’ selection was equivocal because 
they inserted their hands in both holes or they switched 
rapidly between the two options. In those cases, E pushed 
the platform back and forth again until the subject made 
an unambiguous decision.
Scoring and analysis
We scored the first choice of the subjects after E had pushed 
the sliding table to the subject. A second coder naïve to the 
hypotheses and theoretical background of the study scored 
20% of all trials to assess inter-observer reliability, which 
was excellent (Κ = 0.99, N = 456, p < 0.001).
We used a generalized linear mixed model (GLMM; 
Baayen 2008) with binomial error structure and logit link 
function to analyse the effects of condition, sex, age, spe-
cies, order of experimental conditions, and session on apes’ 
choices (correct/incorrect). We included these factors as 
fixed effects and subject ID as random effect. Additionally, 
to keep type I error rate at the nominal level of 5% (Barr 
et al. 2013; Schielzeth and Forstmeier 2009), we included 
all random slope components of condition (dummy coded), 
order of condition, and session. As an overall test of the 
effect of the predictor variables we compared the full model 
with a null model lacking the fixed effects but compris-
ing of the same random effects structure as the full model 
(Forstmeier and Schielzeth 2011) using a likelihood ratio 
test (Dobson 2002). p values for the individual effects were 
based on likelihood ratio tests comparing the full with the 
respective reduced models (Barr et al. 2013; R function 
drop1).
We assessed model stability by comparing the estimates 
derived by a model based on all data with those estimates 
obtained from models with individual subjects excluded one 
at a time. This revealed the model to be stable with regard 
to the fixed effects. Overdispersion appeared to be no issue 
(dispersion parameter: 0.86).
Additionally, we used Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests to 
examine whether performance deviated significantly from 
the hypothetical chance level (p = 0.5). At the individual 
and for first trial analysis, we conducted binomial tests with 
a hypothetical probability of p = 0.5. All p values reported 
throughout this study are exact and two tailed.
Results
We found evidence that apes used the mirror and shadow 
cues spontaneously to locate the food. Apes performed 
significantly better in the shadow and mirror condition 
compared to the control condition. Additionally, their per-
formance in the shadow and mirror conditions was above 
chance levels. Analyses of the individual performances con-
firmed this result.
A GLMM comprising of the factors condition, order of 
mirror and shadow conditions, session, species, age, and 
sex was significant compared to a null model lacking these 
factors (likelihood ratio test: χ2 = 73.6, df = 9, p < 0.001; 
see Online Resource 1, for the model output). Condition 
had a significant effect on performance (χ2 = 67.7, df = 3, 
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p < 0.001; see Fig. 2). Apes performed significantly better in 
the baseline (χ2 = 38.7, df = 1, p < 0.001), mirror (χ2 = 18.0, 
df = 1, p < 0.001), and shadow condition (1.08 ± 0.23, 
χ2 = 17.1, df = 1, p < 0.001) compared to the control con-
dition. Moreover, apes performed better in the baseline 
condition compared to the shadow condition (χ2 = 8.1, 
df = 1, p = 0.004) but not compared to the mirror condition 
(χ2 = 1.8, df = 1, p = 0.180). There was no significant dif-
ference between shadow and mirror condition (χ2 = 2.95, 
df = 1, p = 0.086). We found no significant effect of species 
(χ2 = 2.3, df = 2, p = 0.322), the order of conditions, (χ2 = 0.1, 
df = 1, p = 0.816), session (χ2 = 1.0, df = 1, p = 0.328), age 
(χ2 = 0.002, df = 1, p = 0.964), or sex (χ2 = 1.7, df = 1, 
p = 0.195).
Apes performed significantly better than expected by 
chance in the baseline (mean ± SE: 0.86 ± 0.02; Wilcoxon 
signed-ranks test: T+ = 300, N = 24, p < 0.001), shadow 
(0.71 ± 0.04; T+ = 218, N = 21, p < 0.001), and mirror condi-
tion (0.76 ± 0.04; T+ = 209, N = 20, p < 0.001) but not in the 
control condition (0.51 ± 0.02; T+ = 129, N = 20, p = 0.380). 
This pattern of findings was already present in the first ses-
sion of each experimental condition (shadow: T+ = 141, 
N = 18, p = 0.010; mirror: T+ = 132, N = 16, p < 0.001, mir-
ror analysis without the data of the three orangutans that 
received another experimental setup initially). First trial 
analysis showed that apes performed above chance in the 
mirror condition (16 of 21 individuals chose correctly, bino-
mial test: p = 0.027) but not in the shadow condition (15 of 
23 individuals chose correctly, p = 0.210).
At the individual level, five out of eight bonobos, eight 
out of ten chimpanzees, and all six orangutans performed 
above chance in the baseline condition (binomial test, 
p < 0.05). In the shadow condition, four out of eight bon-
obos, four out of nine chimpanzees, and three out of six 
orangutans performed significantly above chance. In the 
mirror condition, three out of eight bonobos, six out of 
ten chimpanzees, and five out of six orangutans (for three 
of these orangutans the mirror condition was repeated) 
performed significantly above chance. In the control con-
dition, none of the apes performed significantly above 
chance.
Discussion
We found that some individuals of all examined ape spe-
cies used shadows and mirror images of hidden food items 
as a cue to locate them. Other individuals did not use these 
cues. The reasons for the observed individual differences 
are unclear but attention to the problem situation, food 
motivation, and more specific cognitive differences might 
play a role here. We found no evidence that apes’ per-
formance improved across sessions. On the contrary, we 
found that they used both cues already in their first session 
(i.e., within the first six trials with these cues), and mirror 
images already in their first trial.
However, these findings leave a number of open ques-
tions regarding apes’ understanding of these optical 
effects. With regard to the shadows, did they associate 
the silhouette with the location of the food based on rapid 
reinforcement learning? Or did the apes make use of 
the silhouette because they inferred location of the food 
reward as the physical referent of the shadow? If reinforce-
ment learning was sufficient to explain apes’ performance, 
we expected that they would learn to use a perceptually 
similar and equally deterministic cue to locate the food 
within the same number of trials (see Experiment 2). With 
regard to the mirror images, first trial performance showed 
that reinforcement learning was not a viable explanation. 
However, in the latter case, apes might just have confused 
the mirror reflection with its physical referent. It is possi-
ble that they pointed toward the food they saw (in the mir-
ror) without taking into account that it was just a reflection 
of the food reward. Thus, the question is whether apes 
discriminated between appearance and reality in the case 
of the mirror image.
Moreover, motion cues were available in both experi-
mental conditions. The moving shadow or mirror reflec-
tion of the food reward was visible before the apes were 
allowed to choose. These motion cues may have directed 
their attention to the correct side which could potentially 
explain apes’ performance without invoking any higher-
level processing of these optical effects. Were such motion 
cues necessary and/or sufficient to allow apes to exploit 
these optical cues?
The remaining experiments addressed these questions 
one by one. In the next experiment, we introduced a con-
trol condition, which shared perceptual features (including 
motion cues) and the reinforcement regime with the shadow 
condition but lacked the causal relation between cue and 
food location.
0
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Fig. 2  Experiment 1: proportion of correct trials (mean ± SE) as a 
function of condition
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Experiment 2
In this experiment, we examined whether reinforcement 
learning was sufficient to account for apes’ performance in 
the shadow condition of Experiment 1. To control for this 
possibility, we presented a sample of naïve chimpanzees 
with a novel control condition in addition to the shadow con-
dition. In this arbitrary control condition (Call 2006), apes 
could use a perceptually similar and equally 100% determin-
istic cue (a black rubber patch of similar shape as the silhou-
ette of the food reward) to locate the food. If reinforcement 
learning explained apes’ performance in the shadow condi-
tion, we expected a similar performance in both conditions. 
However, if the causal relation between the silhouette and 
food reward was relevant for chimpanzees’ performance, we 
expected better performance in the shadow condition com-
pared to the arbitrary condition. In the latter condition, the 
experimenter moved the rubber patch to one side of the plat-
form in full view of the subject. If the apes were sensitive to 
the causal relations involved, the experimenter’s intervention 
should lead them to discount the rubber patch as a predictor 
of the food location.
Materials and methods
Subjects
Eleven chimpanzees participated in this experiment. These 
chimpanzees were naïve with regard to the current shadow 
setup. They participated in the shadow condition of the pilot 
experiment. Neither of these apes scored above chance in 
this pilot experiment. One chimpanzee (Corrie) did not 
approach the platform within four sessions and was, there-
fore, excluded from the study.
Apparatus
We used the same setup as in Experiment 1.
Design
We administered four conditions: baseline, control, and 
shadow condition as well as a new condition, the arbitrary 
control. As in Experiment 1, baseline and control trials were 
intermixed with the experimental conditions. The experi-
mental conditions were blocked with half of individuals 
starting with the shadow condition and the other half with 
the arbitrary control condition. The two groups were coun-
terbalanced for age and sex as much as possible (arbitrary 
first: MAge: 25.9 years, 4 females, 1 male; shadow first: MAge: 
25.2 years, 3 females, 3 males). All other aspects of the 
design including the trial and session numbers were identi-
cal to Experiment 1.
Procedure
The baseline and control condition were identical to Experi-
ment 1. The shadow condition was also similar to Experi-
ment 1 with the exception that E waited 8 s after the food 
was covered before he called the subjects by their names (to 
ensure that the apes would pay attention to the platform) 
and displaced the food reward by means of a string under-
neath the sliding platform. The 8 s interval was introduced 
to keep the timing of cue presentation equal between the 
shadow condition and the novel arbitrary condition. In the 
arbitrary control condition, there were no lights under the 
lateral covers, and therefore, no shadows. However, E fixed 
a black rubber patch of approximately the same shape and 
size as the silhouette of the food reward (8 cm × 5.5 cm) on 
the vertical partition onto which the shadows were cast in 
the shadow condition to indicate the location of the food 
(see Fig. 1e). As in the shadow condition, E first placed the 
lateral covers on the platform, placed a piece of banana in 
the centre on top of the displacement device, and covered 
the reward by means of the central cover. In contrast to the 
shadow condition, E displaced the out-of-sight reward right 
away. Eight seconds after he had covered the food reward, 
E lifted the rubber patch from behind the platform while 
calling the subject. E then placed the rubber patch centrally 
on the subject’s side of the vertical partition, moved it to the 
side where the food was hidden, and fixated it to the verti-
cal partition (with a magnet attached to the backside of the 
rubber patch). E then pushed the platform forward and the 
subject could make a choice. In all conditions, E avoided 
making eye contact with the subjects during the trials to 
reduce the probability that subjects would interpret these 
cues as communicative signals (Gómez 1996).
Scoring and analysis
Scoring was identical to Experiment 1. We used a GLMM 
with the same factors as in Experiment 1 (except for the 
factor species). The model was stable for all fixed effects 
when subjects were excluded one at a time. Overdispersion 
appeared to be no issue (dispersion parameter: 0.96).
Results
We found that naïve chimpanzees used the shadows but not 
the rubber patch (arbitrary condition) as a cue to locate the 
food. In the shadow condition, apes performed better than 
in the control condition and above chance levels; neither of 
which applied for the arbitrary condition.
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A GLMM comprising the factors condition, order of 
experimental conditions, session, age, and sex was sig-
nificant compared to a null model lacking these factors 
(χ2 = 28.5, df = 7, p < 0.001; see Online Resource 1). Condi-
tion had a significant effect on performance (χ2 = 24.8, df = 3, 
p < 0.001; see Fig. 3). Apes performed significantly better in 
the baseline (χ2 = 19.2, df = 1, p < 0.001) and shadow con-
dition (χ2 = 6.5, df = 1, p = 0.011) compared to the control 
condition. Likewise, apes performed better in the baseline 
condition (χ2 = 18.5, df = 1, p < 0.001) and the shadow con-
dition (χ2 = 5.3, df = 1, p = 0.021) compared to the arbitrary 
condition. Apes performed also better in the baseline condi-
tion than the shadow condition (χ2 = 13.2, df = 1, p < 0.001). 
In contrast, there was no significant difference between the 
arbitrary and control condition (χ2 = 0.2, df = 1, p = 0.664). 
We found no significant effect of the order of experimen-
tal conditions (χ2 = 1.5, df = 1, p = 0.221), session (χ2 = 0.7, 
df = 1, p = 0.387), age (χ2 = 3.19, df = 1, p = 0.074), or sex 
(χ2 = 0.29, df = 1, p = 0.588).
Apes performed significantly better than the hypotheti-
cal chance level of 50% correct in the shadow (mean ± SE: 
0.68 ± 0.05; T+ = 36, N = 8, p = 0.008) and baseline condi-
tion (0.86 ± 0.03; T+ = 55, N = 10, p = 0.002) but not in the 
arbitrary (0.53 ± 0.02; T+ = 33.5, N = 9, p = 0.254) or con-
trol condition (0.51 ± 0.03; T+ = 8.5, N = 5, p = 0.938). At 
the individual level, 3 out of 10 individuals scored signifi-
cantly above chance in the shadow condition (binomial test 
p < 0.05), in contrast to the arbitrary and control condition 
in which none of the individuals did. In the baseline condi-
tion, 8 out of 10 subjects performed better than expected 
by chance.
Discussion
We replicated the results obtained in Experiment 1. Naïve 
chimpanzees used the shadows as cue to locate food but they 
did not learn to use a perceptually very similar cue to locate 
the food within the same number of trials despite both cues 
being equally and fully deterministic.
One might argue that apes failed to use the rubber patch 
as a cue because it was only shown and moved 8 s after the 
hiding of the food. This time lag might have disrupted their 
causal perception of the situation (Michotte 1963; for a simi-
lar argument regarding the balance paradigm, see Povinelli 
2011). Even though causal perception typically requires 
perceptual contact between two colliding objects (which is 
not the case here or in the balance task; see Hanus and Call 
2008), we explicitly controlled for the changes in the tem-
poral structure. Therefore, we introduced the same time lag 
also in the shadow condition. The temporal structure was 
identical in the two conditions; nevertheless, apes treated 
them differently. Likewise, both conditions involved motion 
cues (i.e., the movement of the silhouette in the shadow con-
dition and the experimenter moving the rubber patch in the 
arbitrary condition), which were, therefore, insufficient to 
explain apes’ performance. However, it is possible that the 
“self-propelledness” of the moving silhouette made this cue 
more salient to the apes.
In a recent review of the literature on inferential abilities 
of nonhuman animals (Völter and Call 2017), we came to the 
conclusion that temporal structure helps great apes to dis-
count alternative causes. Temporal structure was available 
in the current task (the cue was moved before apes could see 
that the food was not in the central position anymore) but 
it could not account for the differences between conditions 
either. At the time of choice, apes could see a perceptually 
similar situation in the shadow and arbitrary condition: a 
dark cue of similar shape as the food reward was visible on 
one side of the platform. The crucial difference between the 
two conditions was what happened before these cues were 
presented: in the shadow condition, the shadow appeared 
without any obvious intervention of the experimenter. In 
the arbitrary condition, the experimenter moved the rubber 
patch to one side of the platform. It is precisely this interven-
tion by the experimenter that might have altered the situation 
for the apes and that led them to discount the rubber patch 
as relevant piece of information regarding the location of 
the food.
In sum, the current experiment suggests that apes used 
the silhouette of a piece of food by inferring its physical 
referent. For the remainder of this paper, we focused on the 
information apes can extract from mirror images.
Experiment 3
In this experiment, we examined whether apes (like adult 
humans, Higashiyama and Shimono 2004) were capable of 
assessing the distance of an object from their own position 
based on its mirror reflection. If they were able to extract 
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Fig. 3  Experiment 2: proportion of correct trials (mean ± SE) as a 
function of condition
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depth information, we hypothesized, they would point 
toward the location of the (hidden) food reward rather than 
toward its mirror reflection. Conversely, if they confused the 
mirror reflection with its physical referent (i.e., the hidden 
food), we expected that the apes would point toward the 
mirror image regardless of the food location.
Materials and methods
Subjects
All apes who scored significantly above chance in the mirror 
condition of Experiment 1 participated in the pretest of the 
current experiment (N = 14, three bonobos, six chimpanzees, 
and five orangutans).
Apparatus
E sat behind the sliding platform facing the apes, who were 
located behind a metal mesh panel. As in Experiment 1, 
mirrors were mounted on the vertical partition located in 
the back of the platform. We used four screens as poten-
tial hiding places of the food reward (a piece of banana). 
Two of these screens were close to the mesh panel (proxi-
mal screens) and two were further away from it (distal 
screens). The screens were located on the left and right 
side of the platform (see Fig. 4 and see Online Resource 
1). The food could thus be hidden on the left or right side 
and proximal or distant from the apes’ location behind the 
mesh panel. The screens were of different shape and col-
our. The proximal screens had the shape of an inverted L 
(19 cm × 3.5 cm × 5 cm); the distal screens were C-shaped 
(15 cm × 6 cm). In the pretest and the transparent condition 
of the test phase, all screens were transparent; in the opaque 
condition, the proximal screens were brown and the distal 
screens were green. For this experiment, we tilted the slid-
ing platform so that the side closest to the apes was lower in 
height than to the distal side. Due to the inclination of the 
platform, the proximal screens were beneath the mesh panel 
when E pushed the platform forward. We used an inclined 
platform to reduce the likelihood that the apes would touch 
the proximal screen accidentally while pointing toward the 
distal screen.
Design
In the pretest, there were no mirrors and the screens were 
transparent. The pretest served to ensure that apes would try 
to access food within-reach by directly removing or touching 
the proximal screen or pointing downwards toward the proxi-
mal screen while they would point straight ahead toward the 
out-of-reach food without touching the unbaited, proximal 
screen. Subjects received 12 trials per session, 6 trials with 
the food in the proximal and distal location. Apes received 
a maximum of three sessions. If they did not meet the crite-
rion (details below) within these three sessions, they were 
excluded from this experiment. Two (out of three) bono-
bos, all six chimpanzees, and four (out of five) orangutans 
(N = 12) met the criterion.
The subjects who passed the pretest entered the test 
phase. In the test, two mirrors were mounted on the left and 
right side of the platform. We used a 2 × 2 within-subject 
design: E hid the reward either in a proximal or distal loca-
tion from the apes and either behind transparent or opaque 
screens. We administered three trials per cell (proximal/
distal × transparent/opaque) and session for a total of 12 tri-
als per session. The side of the food reward was counter-
balanced across trials and the order was randomized with 
the restriction that food was hidden at the same side for a 
maximum of three consecutive trials. Subjects received four 
sessions for a total of 12 trials per cell.
Procedure
At the start of each pretest and test trial, E positioned the 
transparent or opaque (in test trials only) screens on the plat-
form, occluded the platform and hid the food reward behind 
one of the four screens. E’s hand visited every screen while 
hiding the food in the following order: distal left, proxi-
mal left, proximal right, and distal right. After the hiding 
(a) Distal 
(opaque) 
(b)  Proximal 
(opaque) 
Fig. 4  Experiment 3: illustration of the setup in the opaque condition 
from the subjects’ perspective. The food was hidden either behind 
one of the (green) distal (a) or (brown) proximal screens (b). Two 
mirrors in the back of the platform indicate the final position of the 
food reward (yellow oval). (Color figure online)
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of the bait, E removed the occluder from the platform and 
pushed the platform forward. Apes could make a choice by 
sticking their fingers through the mesh panel (see Online 
Resource 3). We administered differential reinforcement for 
their lateral choice (correct or incorrect side) but not for the 
distance of the food reward. If the apes touched or pointed 
downwards to the proximal screen, E first lifted the indicated 
screen and passed food located behind it to the apes. If the 
apes did not touch the proximal screen and pointed toward 
the distal screen, E lifted the distal screen first. If the food 
was not located behind the indicated screen, E lifted first 
the indicated screen, then the other screen on the same side, 
and passed the food behind the latter screen to the subjects.
Scoring and analysis
We scored whether the apes pointed to the correct side and 
whether they touched/pointed toward the proximal or the dis-
tal screen. The form of the pointing gesture varied between 
individuals with some apes pointing with only one finger 
and others using their whole hand. Irrespective of these dif-
ferences, we coded the direction of the extended finger(s). 
We scored trials as correct when the apes touched or pointed 
toward the (baited) proximal screen in the proximal condi-
tion and when they pointed toward the (baited) distal screen 
in the distal condition. The criterion for the pretest was to 
score five out of six trials correct in both conditions within 
a session. A second coder naïve to the hypotheses and theo-
retical background scored 21% of all trials from the recorded 
video material to establish inter-observer reliability. The vid-
eotapes showed the actions of the experimenter, the baiting 
status of the platform, and the choices of the subjects. Inter-
observer reliability was excellent according to the guidelines 
by Fleiss (1981; correct side: Κ = 0.95, N = 120, p < 0.001; 
touching/pointing: Κ = 0.84, N = 120, p < 0.001).
We used a GLMM (Baayen 2008) with binomial error 
structure and logit link function to analyse the effects of 
visibility, distance of the bait, species, trial number, and ses-
sion on apes’ lateral choices (correct/incorrect) and point-
ing (proximal/distal). Regarding model stability, the models 
were stable for all fixed effect except for visibility. We found 
considerable variation for visibility in the lateral choice anal-
ysis (estimates of visibility when subjects were excluded one 
at a time: orig. − 3.9, min. − 20.6, max. − 3.7). The varia-
tion of estimates indicates that the effect of visibility got 
stronger if certain individuals were excluded. Overdispersion 
appeared to be no issue (dispersion parameter: correct side: 
0.79, distance: 0.82).
Results
We found evidence that apes extracted depth information 
from the mirror images. More specifically, apes adjusted 
their response to the distance of the food by pointing toward 
the proximal or the distal screen depending on the location 
of the food and even when the food was only visible in the 
mirror.
We first analysed whether apes chose the correct side 
across conditions. A GLMM with the factors visibility, 
distance, trial number, session, and species was signifi-
cant compared to a null model without these fixed effects 
(χ2 = 38.5, df = 6, p < 0.001; see Online Resource 1). 
Apes performed significantly better when the food was 
directly visible than when it was only visible via the mirror 
(χ2 = 24.1, df = 1, p < 0.001). Moreover, subjects performed 
better when the food was distal compared to when it was 
proximal (χ2 = 16.3, df = 1, p < 0.001). In contrast, we found 
no effects of trial number (χ2 = 0.1, df = 1, p = 0.744), ses-
sion (χ2 = 0.2, df = 1, p = 0.630), or species (χ2 = 0.3, df = 2, 
p = 0.870) on performance.
In all conditions, apes performed significantly better (by 
selecting the correct side) than expected by chance (clear-
proximal: mean ± SE: 0.99 ± 0.01; T+ = 78, N = 12, p < 0.001; 
clear distal: 1.00 ± 0.00; T+ = 78, N = 12, p < 0.001; opaque 
proximal: 0.77 ± 0.05; T+ = 75.5, N = 12, p = 0.002; opaque 
distal: 0.94 ± 0.02; T+ = 78, N = 12, p < 0.001). At the indi-
vidual level, 12 out of 13 individuals performed significantly 
above chance in the opaque condition and all 13 individuals 
performed above chance in the clear condition (binomial 
test: p < 0.05).
Next, we analysed whether apes adjusted their response to 
the distance of the food by touching or pointing toward the 
proximal screen or pointing toward the distal screen. For this 
analysis, we only used trials in which apes chose the correct 
side because there was no reason to expect that apes would 
differentiate between the proximal and distal condition when 
they pointed to the incorrect side. A GLMM including vis-
ibility, distance, and the two-way interaction between these 
factors as well as session and species was significant com-
pared to a null model (χ2 = 34.6, df = 6, p < 0.001; see Online 
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Fig. 5  Experiment 3: proportion of trials (mean ± SE) in which apes 
touched or pointed toward the proximal screen as a function of reward 
position (proximal/distal) and reward visibility (clear/opaque screens)
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Resource 1). We found a significant interaction between vis-
ibility of the food and its distance (χ2 = 5.6, df = 1, p = 0.017; 
see Fig. 5) but no significant effects of session (χ2 = 1.34, 
df = 1, p = 0.248) or species (χ2 = 0.9, df = 2, p = 0.633). Post 
hoc tests show that apes were more likely to point toward the 
proximal screen when the food was behind it than when it 
was located behind the distal screen both in the clear condi-
tion (χ2 = 19.2, df = 1, p < 0.001) and in the opaque condition 
(χ2 = 15.7, df = 1, p < 0.001) even though the effect in the 
latter condition was smaller. This difference between the 
proximal (clear proximal: mean ± SE: 0.86 ± 0.09; opaque 
proximal: 0.79 ± 0.12) and distal condition (clear distal: 
0.27 ± 0.10; opaque distal: 0.48 ± 0.13) was already pre-
sent in the first test session (clear: T+ = 36, N = 8, p = 0.008; 
opaque: T+ = 28, N = 7, p = 0.016). The performance was 
similar when all trials were considered including trials in 
which apes chose the incorrect side (mean ± SE: clear-prox-
imal: 0.88 ± 0.06; opaque proximal: 0.81 ± 0.08; clear distal: 
0.38 ± 0.08; opaque distal: 0.63 ± 0.08).
Discussion
First, the current results replicate and extend the findings of 
Experiment 1. Eleven out of 12 apes chose the correct side 
above chance levels in the opaque condition indicating that 
they paid attention to the mirror images. Apes used the mirror 
to locate the food even in the absence of motion cues that were 
available in Experiment 1. Besides, apes performed better 
when the food was in the distal position than in the proximal 
position. These findings can be attributed to the fact that the 
mirror image of the food in the distal position was larger (the 
food was closer to mirror), and therefore, more salient.
Second and more importantly, apes further modulated 
their response according to the details of the mirror image 
suggesting that they did not confuse the mirror image with 
its physical referent. Depending on the distance of the food 
relative to them, apes tried to access the food directly by 
touching, removing, or pointing toward the proximal screen 
or they pointed toward the distal screen. Crucially, apes 
could extract such depth information about the distance of 
the reward from the mirror image alone. Apes might have 
used different pieces of information to extract the depth 
information from the mirror. For instance, they might have 
used the vertical position of the mirror image of the food 
reward (the lower the mirror image the closer the food was 
to the mirror), the proximity of the food reward to one of 
the opaque screens (i.e., matching the colour and shape of 
the screen next to the food in the mirror to the screens on 
the platform), or the size of the mirror image of the food 
(the larger the mirror image the closer the food was to the 
mirror). These possibilities are of course not mutually 
exclusive and subjects may have exploited a combination of 
these different sources of information. Importantly, however, 
reinforcement learning was not sufficient to explain apes’ 
pointing response because we did not apply differential rein-
forcement for apes’ pointing style to discriminate between 
proximal and distal screens.
Experiment 4
In this experiment, we examined whether apes could use 
another aspect of the geometrical relations between mirror 
reflections and their physical referents, the law of reflection, 
which states that the angle of incident equals the angle of 
reflection. We presented apes with a situation, in which the 
orientation of the mirror predicted the location of the food 
reward and examined whether the apes would use this infor-
mation when searching for the food. Naive human observers 
are sensitive to the law of reflection even though their predic-
tions are not perfect (e.g., Bertamini et al. 2003; Bertamini 
and Wynne 2010; Croucher et al. 2002; Hecht et al. 2005). 
We compared apes’ performance in the mirror condition to 
a control condition in which the orientation of a static pic-
ture of the food reward predicted the location of the food 
reward. The mirror images differed in several ways from the 
picture stimuli that just showed the food reward on white 
background, including the complexity of the depicted scene 
in the mirror and the dynamic nature of the mirror image 
that became apparent when subjects moved their heads or 
the platform was moved. We hypothesized that if the apes 
took the geometrical relation between mirror and referent into 
consideration, they would adjust their choices to the orienta-
tion of the mirror but not to the orientation of the picture.
Materials and methods
Subjects
All apes who scored significantly above chance in the mirror 
condition of Experiment 1 participated (N = 14, three bono-
bos, six chimpanzees, and five orangutans). One orangutan 
(Dokana) stopped participating after five sessions. For this 
reason, we only analysed the data of her first experimental 
condition (picture condition) tested against the hypothetical 
chance level.
Apparatus
E sat behind the sliding platform facing the apes who were 
located behind a Plexiglas panel. The Plexiglas panel con-
tained two big, horizontally aligned holes (diameter: 6 cm) 
serving as response locations. In the centre of the panel there 
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was a small hole (diameter 1 cm) for a juice dispenser (an 
infusion bottle mounted above the panel with a hose lead-
ing to the hole in the panel). During trials, the apes received 
diluted grape juice (concentration 1:3) to keep their angle of 
vision constant and centred. The flow of juice was reduced 
or terminated between trials. As in the previous experiments, 
apes were required to locate a hidden piece of banana. We 
used mirrors and pictures of a banana slice as cues. The 
pictures of the banana slice were taken from a similar angle 
as they appeared in the mirror from the apes’ perspective. 
The picture of the banana slice (3.3 cm × 4.0 cm; similar in 
size to the mirror image of the banana slice in the congruent 
condition) was then isolated, printed on white background, 
and glued to the backside of one of the mirrors. The distrac-
tor cue in the picture condition consisted of a blank, white 
paper glued to the backside of the second mirror.
The two mirrors/pictures (7.5 cm × 15 cm) were mounted 
on rotatable stands close to the experimenter side of the 
platform (for pictures and videos of the setup, see Online 
Resource 1 and 4). The mirrors/pictures were 11.5 cm apart 
from each other. When the mirrors on the stands were turned 
the angle of incidence changed. The two end positions of 
each stand (and therefore also the angles of incidence) were 
pre-determined by two screws that protruded from the plat-
form. The food could be hidden behind two screens (the 
L-shaped screens from Experiment 3) located in front of the 
left and right response holes in the Plexiglas panel.
In the congruent position, the mirrors/pictures were 
turned by 25° towards the outside. In this case, the sub-
jects could see behind the screens on the same side as the 
respective mirror. That is, they could see the mirror image 
of the food on the same side of the platform where the food 
was actually located. The same reinforcement regime was 
applied to the picture condition: when the picture of the 
banana slice was oriented outwards, the food was located 
behind the screen on the same side.
In the incongruent position, the mirrors and pictures were 
turned by 40° towards the inside of the platform. In this 
case, the mirrors showed what was behind the screen on the 
opposite side. That is, the subjects could see in the left mir-
ror when the food was behind the right screen and vice versa. 
Again, the same applied to the picture condition: when fac-
ing inwards, the picture of the food indicated that food was 
located on the opposite side.
Design
We used a 2 × 2 within-subject design: the apes either 
received mirror or pictures as cues and the orientation of 
these cues was either congruent (facing outwards, the mirror 
image/picture of the food indicated the presence of food on 
the same side) or incongruent (facing inwards, the mirror 
image/picture indicated the presence of food on the opposite 
side). We blocked the mirror and picture condition into 4 
consecutive sessions of 12 trials each. The order of condition 
was counterbalanced across subjects while balancing the two 
groups as much as possible regarding species, age, and sex 
(mirror first: MAge: 18.4 years, 2 males, 6 females; image 
first: MAge: 23.8 years, 2 males, 4 females). Per session, 
subjects received three blocks of four trials each. Within a 
block, the side of the food and congruence of the cue was 
fully crossed and the order of trials within a block was ran-
domized. Subjects received 8 sessions for a total of 24 trials 
per cell.
Procedure
At the start of each trial, the mirror/pictures were oriented 
parallel to the platform. Then, the subject’s view to the plat-
form was occluded. E hid the reward behind one of the two 
screens by visiting first the left and then the right screen 
leaving the food behind one of the screens. E exchanged the 
pictures if necessary and turned the mirrors/pictures either 
outwards (congruent condition) or inwards (incongruent 
condition). Subsequently, he lifted the occluder and pushed 
the platform forward. The apes could now make a choice and 
E lifted the screen indicated by the subject. Subjects received 
the food reward if they chose correctly. If they decided for 
the incorrect side, E first lifted the unbaited screen, then the 
baited screen, and discarded the food.
Scoring and analysis
We scored whether or not subjects chose the side with 
the mirror image or picture of the food. Again, we used a 
GLMM (Baayen 2008) with binomial error structure and 
logit link function to analyse the effects of cue type, con-
gruence, order of cue type presentation, all two-way and 
three-way interactions between these factors, and species 
on subjects’ choices. The models were stable for the effects 
of cue type, congruence, order of condition, and the inter-
actions between these factors. Overdispersion was no issue 
(dispersion parameter: 0.97).
Results
Apes selected the side where they could see the mirror 
image of the food more often when the mirrors were ori-
ented outwards (i.e., directed toward the screens on the same 
side) than inwards (i.e., directed toward the screens on the 
opposite side). The orientation of the picture, in contrast, 
had no such effect on apes’ performance.
In a GLMM containing the factors cue type (mirror, pic-
ture), congruence (congruent, incongruent), order of cue-
type condition, the two- and three-way interactions between 
these factors as well as species was significant compared 
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to a null model lacking these factors (likelihood ratio test: 
χ2 = 27.9, df = 9, p = 0.001; see Online Resource 1). The 
three-way interaction between cue type, congruence, and 
the order of the cue-type presentation had a significant effect 
on apes’ performance (χ2 = 8.7, df = 1, p = 0.003; see Fig. 6) 
whereas species had not (χ2 = 2.5, df = 2, p = 0.287).
Focusing on the between-subject manipulation (first cue 
type presented to each subject), we found a significant two-
way interaction between cue type and congruence (χ2 = 7.4, 
df = 1, p = 0.006). Subjects decided more often for the side 
where they could see the food when the mirrors were in con-
gruent rather than incongruent orientation (χ2 = 9.4, df = 1, 
p = 0.002). In contrast, the congruence of the picture had no 
significant effect on performance (χ2 = 0.2, df = 1, p = 0.659).
Focusing on the within-subject manipulation, we found a 
significant interaction between cue type and congruence for 
the individuals who started with the mirror condition (χ2 = 4.8, 
df = 1, p = 0.029). These individuals showed an effect of con-
gruence in the mirror condition (see above) but not in the 
picture condition (χ2 = 1.0, df = 1, p = 0.307). In contrast, 
individuals who started with the picture condition showed 
no significant interaction between cue type and congruence 
(χ2 = 0.1, df = 1, p = 0.776). The latter individuals looked more 
often to the side where they could see the food in the mirror 
condition (presented after the picture condition) compared 
to the initial picture condition (χ2 = 4.1, df = 1, p = 0.042) but 
their performance was not significantly affected by the orien-
tation of these cues (χ2 = 0.6, df = 1, p = 0.438).
Looking at the first session (full–null model comparison: 
χ2 = 11.2, df = 5, p = 0.047; see Online Resource 1), we found 
no significant interaction between cue type and congruence 
(χ2 = 1.79, df = 1, p = 0.181). We then removed the interaction 
but we found no significant main effects of cue type (χ2 = 0.02, 
df = 1, p = 0.887) or congruence (χ2 = 0.5, df = 1, p = 0.472). 
Species, however, had a significant effect on performance 
(χ2 = 8.83, df = 2, p = 0.012) with chimpanzees deciding more 
often for the side were they could see the food than bonobos 
(χ2 = 8.8, df = 1, p = 0.003). There were no significant dif-
ferences between orangutans and bonobos (χ2 = 2.0, df = 1, 
p = 0.162) or chimpanzees (χ2 = 2.5, df = 1, p = 0.117).
In line with these findings, apes who started with the mir-
ror condition selected the side where they could see the mir-
ror image of the food more often than expected by chance 
with a congruent mirror orientation (mean ± SE: 0.73 ± 0.06; 
T+ = 36, N = 8, p = 0.008) but not with an incongruent mirror 
orientation (0.56 ± 0.07; T+ = 21, N = 8, p = 0.742). In con-
trast, apes who started with the picture condition did not select 
the side with the picture of the food significantly more often 
in the picture congruent (0.52 ± 0.03; T+ = 6, N = 4, p = 1) or 
incongruent condition (0.54 ± 0.04; T+ = 12, N = 6, p = 0.906).
Discussion
In this experiment, we examined whether apes were sensi-
tive to the geometrical relation between the orientation of 
a mirror and mirrored objects. Even though apes initially 
(i.e., in session 1) showed no significant preference for the 
mirror image of a banana slice compared to the picture, apes 
learned to discriminate between the congruent and incongru-
ent mirror orientation within four sessions. In contrast, apes 
that started with the picture condition did not learn to use the 
picture orientation as predictor of the food location.
However, irrespective of the order of conditions, apes’ 
performance in the incongruent condition did not deviate 
significantly from chance. This finding could be related to a 
limited understanding of the optical relations involved or it 
might hint to an inhibition problem. For example, the differ-
ence in performance between the congruent and incongruent 
condition might be attributed to larger size of the mirror 
reflections of the food reward in the congruent condition 
compared to the incongruent condition. Alternatively, apes’ 
prepotent response in this situation might have been to select 
the side where they could see the image of the reward. In 
the incongruent condition, however, pointing to the location 
of the hidden food reward required them to select the side 
where they could not see the image of the food reward.
Additionally, the within-subject comparison was con-
founded by an order effect. Individuals who started with the 
picture condition, unlike those who started with the mir-
ror condition, did not learn to use the mirror orientation as 
discriminatory stimulus. Given this order effect, the within-
subject comparison needs to be interpreted with caution. We 
can only speculate why apes who started with the picture 
condition did not learn to use the mirror orientation as dis-
criminatory cue. The picture condition might have been con-
fusing for the apes given that there was no causal connection 
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Fig. 6  Experiment 4: proportion of trials (mean ± SE) in which sub-
jects chose the side where they could see the food as a function of 
condition, cue type, and order of cue-type presentation. In the con-
gruent condition, the food is located on the same side as the food 
image, whereas in the incongruent condition it is located on the oppo-
site side
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between the orientation of the picture and the location of 
the food. This may have turned the task into a reverse con-
tingency task, which is notoriously difficult for apes (e.g., 
Albiach-Serrano and Call 2014; Boysen and Berntson 1995; 
Vlamings et al. 2006). Frustration induced by such a coun-
terintuitive task may have masked apes’ performance in the 
subsequent mirror condition.
Finally, one might object that the picture stimulus pos-
sibly was not as salient as the mirror image. If that was true, 
one might expect that apes were more drawn to the mirror 
image of the food right from the beginning of the experi-
ment. However, we found no differences between the mirror 
and picture cue types in session 1. Nevertheless, we tried to 
improve the picture control stimulus in the final experiment 
by enhancing the similarity between the mirror image and a 
picture control stimulus.
Experiment 5
In the final experiment, we addressed the question of 
whether prior experience with the properties of mirrors (as 
opposed to those of static pictures) affected chimpanzees’ 
interpretation and usage of these cues. We hypothesized 
that subjects might extract information from mirror images 
conditional on their experience with mirror properties. In 
this experiment, we focused on experience at two different 
timescales: the experience chimpanzees had acquired during 
Experiments 1, 3, and 4 and a direct demonstration of the 
dynamic properties of mirrors before each trial. We expected 
that mirror-experienced chimpanzees would use the mirror 
images more frequently to locate hidden food than mirror-
naïve ones. Further we expected that apes would use a mir-
ror image to locate its physical referent more effectively if 
they received a mirror demonstration before the onset of a 
trial. Conversely, we hypothesized that apes would not use 
this cue to the same extent if they received a demonstration 
showing that the cue was merely a static picture of the mir-
ror image.
Materials and methods
Subjects
All six chimpanzees who scored significantly above chance 
in the mirror condition of Experiment 1 and eight mirror-
naïve chimpanzees participated in this experiment.
Apparatus
We used the same sliding platform and lateral covers as in 
the mirror condition of Experiment 1. We also used the Plex-
iglas panel with two big, lateral holes and a small, central 
hole for a juice dispenser of Experiment 4. Apes received 
juice during the trials to keep them centred and their angle 
of view stable.
The subjects were presented with two different cue types 
in the current experiment: mirrors and pictures depicting the 
mirror images when the mirrors were in their final position. 
We used two different sets of pictures depending on whether 
the food was hidden behind the left or right cover on the 
platform. In each set, one of the pictures showed a piece 
of banana on top of the displacement device and hidden 
behind one of the lateral covers, whereas the other picture 
showed the backside of the opposite cover without food. 
The photographs were taken from the same position and 
angle that the apes had while drinking juice from the dis-
penser, adjusted for luminosity to mimic the appearance of 
the mirror image, and printed on matt, photographic paper 
(see Online Resource 1, for an example of the experimental 
stimuli). These picture stimuli were glued to the backside of 
the mirrors (15 × 15 cm).
Design
We used a 2 × 2 within-subject design: the apes either 
received a mirror or picture demonstration before each trial 
and they were presented with mirror or pictures as cues 
within each. Apes received eight 12-trial sessions in total. 
Each session consisted of three blocks of four trials each. In 
each block, food location (left, right) and cue type (mirror, 
picture) were completely crossed. The order of trials within 
a block was randomized. The mirror/picture demonstration 
conditions were blocked into four consecutive sessions. Half 
of the subjects started with the mirror demonstration, while 
the other half started with the picture demonstration. The 
two groups were counterbalanced for mirror experience, age, 
and sex as much as possible (mirror first: MAge: 25.1 years, 5 
females, 2 males; picture first: MAge: 25.3 years, 4 females, 
3 males).
Procedure
At the start of each trial, E placed two lateral covers on the 
platform (i.e., the hiding places for the food rewards) and 
placed a piece of banana on the displacement device in the 
centre of the platform (see Fig. 7). E occluded the whole 
platform from the subjects’ view by placing a big screen on 
the platform and moved the baited displacement device via a 
string underneath the platform under one of the lateral cov-
ers. Then, E presented the apes either with two mirrors or 
with two pictures. E held the pictures or mirrors on top of 
each other directly in front of the subjects’ eyes for 3–5 s, 
while they were drinking juice. In the mirror demonstra-
tion (see Fig. 7a), apes could see themselves in the mirror 
when E held the mirrors in front of their face. In the picture 
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demonstration (see Fig. 7b), apes saw pictures of the mirror 
images in their final position taken from the apes’ perspec-
tive. The experimenter then took these cues back, behind the 
screen on the platform and mounted them (with magnets) to 
the vertical partition in the back of the platform. Depending 
on the condition, E would either use the same cue that he had 
shown to the apes before (mirror or picture) or he flipped the 
cues over to invert the cue type (from mirror to picture or vice 
versa; see Online Resource 5). Irrespective of the cue type, 
the mirror image or the picture of the banana slice indicated 
the correct side. E pushed the platform forward and apes were 
allowed to make their choice by pointing through one of two 
lateral holes in the Plexiglas panel. After apes had made their 
choice, E removed the cues from the vertical partition (to 
avoid that subjects would receive additional feedback from 
the mirror images in between trials) and removed the lateral 
cover indicated by the apes. Apes received the food if they 
had chosen correctly; otherwise, E discarded the food.
Scoring and analysis
We scored whether subjects chose the side where they could 
see the food (in the mirror or on the picture) or not. Again, 
we used a GLMM (Baayen 2008) with binomial error struc-
ture and logit link function to analyse the effects of cue type, 
demonstration, mirror experience (six chimpanzees had used 
the mirror images before to locate food, eight chimpanzees 
were not experienced with mirrors), all two-way and three-
way interactions between these factors, and order of dem-
onstration on apes’ choices. The models were stable with 
regard to the fixed effects. Overdispersion appeared to be no 
issue (dispersion parameter: 0.92).
Results
We found that mirror-experienced apes overall performed 
better with mirrors as cues than with pictures irrespec-
tive of the (mirror or picture) demonstration they received 
before each trial. However, in their first session, experienced 
apes performed better than naïve individuals after they had 
received a mirror demonstration but not after a picture dem-
onstrations irrespective of the cue type.
A GLMM with the factors mirror experience, demonstra-
tion, cue type, and all interactions between these factors as 
well as the order of demonstration was significant compared 
to the null model lacking these factors (χ2 = 17.2, df = 8, 
p = 0.028). However, the three-way interaction between mir-
ror experience, demonstration, and cue type was not signifi-
cant (χ2 = 0.01, df = 1, p = 0.905).
A reduced model without this three-way interaction 
was significant compared to a null model (χ2 = 17.2, df = 7, 
p = 0.016; see Table S7). The interaction between cue type 
and mirror experience was significant (χ2 = 7.4, df = 1, 
p = 0.006; see Fig. 8a). The mirror-experienced subjects 
performed better with mirrors compared to pictures of the 
Fig. 7  Experiment 5: illustration 
of the setup from the subjects’ 
perspective. Subjects were pre-
sented either with mirrors (a) 
or pictures of the final mirror 
images (b) while the platform 
was occluded. In the final stage 
of the procedure, subjects saw 
either two mirrors or pictures of 
the mirror images (independent 
of the cue type shown before)
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Fig. 8  Experiment 5: proportion of trials (mean ± SE) in which sub-
jects chose the side with the food image (mirror or picture) as func-
tion of mirror experience and demonstration. a Overall performance; 
b first test session
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mirror images (χ2 = 4.5, df = 1, p = 0.034) in contrast to the 
mirror-naïve individuals (χ2 = 0.04, df = 1, p = 0.846). There 
were no significant interactions between cue type and dem-
onstration (χ2 = 0.003, df = 1, p = 0.956) or mirror experi-
ence and demonstration (χ2 = 0.0001, df = 1, p = 0.994). 
Neither were there significant main effects of demonstra-
tion (χ2 = 0.9, df = 1, p = 0.347) or order of demonstration 
(χ2 = 0.9, df = 1, p = 0.342).
Apes might have learned over sessions that the cue they 
looked at in the demonstration was different from the one 
they looked at in the end of a trial. For this reason, we also 
analysed the first session separately to examine whether 
the mirror/picture demonstration affected apes’ initial per-
formance. The model including the three-way interaction 
between mirror experience, cue type, and demonstration was 
not significant (full–null model comparison: χ2 = 13.2, df = 7, 
p = 0.068), neither was the three-way interaction (χ2 = 0.02, 
df = 1, p = 0.902). A reduced model without the three-way 
interaction, however, was significant when compared to the 
null model (χ2 = 13.1, df = 6, p = 0.041). We found an inter-
action between mirror-experienced and demonstration that 
approached significance (χ2 = 3.73, df = 1, p = 0.053; see 
Fig. 8b). The interactions between mirror experience and 
cue type (χ2 = 0.01, df = 1, p = 0.909) or between cue type 
and demonstration (χ2 = 0.05, df = 1, p = 0.821) were clearly 
not significant.
When removing the interactions that did not approach 
significance (full–null model comparison: χ2 = 13.1, df = 4, 
p = 0.011; see Table S8), we found again that the interaction 
between mirror experience and demonstration approached 
significance (χ2 = 3.81, df = 1, p = 0.051). Subjects with 
mirror experience performed significantly better when they 
received the mirror demonstration compared to mirror-naïve 
individuals (χ2 = 7.96, df = 1, p = 0.005). In contrast, there 
was no difference between experienced and naïve individu-
als when they received the picture demonstration (χ2 = 0.08, 
df = 1, p = 0.775). Moreover, subjects overall selected the 
side with the food significantly more often when they were 
presented with mirrors than with pictures of mirror images 
(χ2 = 5.16, df = 1, p = 0.023).
Mirror-naïve apes performed overall better than chance 
when they received a mirror demonstration (mean ± SE: 
0.63 ± 0.03; T+ = 36, N = 8, p = 0.008) but not when they 
received a picture demonstration (0.59 ± 0.05; T+ = 20, 
N = 6, p = 0.063). Experienced apes performed above chance 
with both the mirror (0.79 ± 0.07; T+ = 21, N = 6, p = 0.031) 
and picture demonstration (0.76 ± 0.07; T+ = 21, N = 6, 
p = 0.031).
Discussion
The results of this experiment indicated that the mir-
ror demonstration only affected the performance of 
mirror-experienced chimpanzees (i.e., individuals who had 
used mirror cues in Experiment 1) in their first session: 
these individuals performed significantly better than naïve 
individuals when they received the mirror demonstration. 
After a picture demonstration, there was no such difference 
between these groups. Overall, experienced individuals 
performed better with mirrors than with pictures (irrespec-
tive of the type of demonstration). Even though the picture 
of the mirror image was almost identical to the mirror 
image, at least with respect to its static properties, experi-
enced individuals treated these cues differently.
A crucial difference between the mirror image and the 
picture were the dynamic aspects of a mirror image. Even 
though we tried to reduce subjects’ head movement using a 
juice dispenser, most of the time, apes were not completely 
still during trials. Especially, when E pushed the platform 
forward most apes stopped drinking, took their head back, 
and made their choice. In addition, the movement of the 
sliding platform changed the relative position of the mir-
rors to the apes. These relative movements between the 
mirrors and the subjects’ eyes might have increased the 
salience of the mirror images compared to the static pic-
tures. Despite these differences between cues, we found 
that the type of demonstration affected the initial perfor-
mance of mirror-experienced apes irrespective of the cue 
type when compared to naïve individuals. It is unclear 
whether this finding was driven by the mirror demonstra-
tion (e.g., serving as a reminder of the mirror properties) 
or by the picture demonstration (e.g., leading apes to dis-
count the static, causally irrelevant cue). Finally, a note of 
caution is required here given the small sample size (and 
the resulting low power) of this between-subject analysis.
Mirror experience refers here to the competence apes have 
shown in the course of Experiment 1, 3, and 4. Mirror-naïve 
chimpanzees did not have any study-related mirror experi-
ence when they participated in the current experiment. Con-
sistent with findings from mirror self-recognition studies, 
our results suggest that even limited experience with mirrors 
changes the way apes interpret mirror images. For example, 
Gallup (1970) reported that chimpanzees showed less social 
responses and more self-directed exploration toward their 
own mirror image after the second day of mirror exposure 
(with 8 h/day). Our findings support the notion that limited 
experience with mirrors allows chimpanzees to understand 
the relation between mirror reflection and its physical refer-
ent. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that some 
or all of the apes (including our mirror naïve individuals) 
had gained some prior experience with reflective surfaces 
(e.g., transparent glass surfaces or water surfaces that are 
part of their indoor and outdoor enclosures) before the study. 
Moreover, the mirror-experienced individuals were selected 
based on their performance in Experiment 1. This selection 
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procedure might have contributed to the observed difference 
between mirror-experienced and naïve individuals.
General discussion
The current set of experiments suggests that great apes are 
sensitive to certain optical relations in their environment. 
First, apes used cues of high similarity (mirror reflections) 
and modest similarity (shadows) with the food reward to 
localize the latter. Reinforcement learning seemed to be 
insufficient to account for apes’ performance given that the 
apes did not pick up equally deterministic and perceptually 
similar cues within the same experimental setup and num-
ber of trials. Second, apes pointed toward the real hiding 
place of a reflected food item instead of its mirror reflec-
tion suggesting that they could extract depth information 
from the mirror image. Third, apes showed some sensitiv-
ity to the orientation of a mirror to locate the reflected 
item. These latter two findings also ruled out that apes 
merely confused mirror reflections with their physical ref-
erents in terms of their spatial location. Finally, limited 
experience with mirrors led apes to interpret static pictures 
differently. Namely, mirror-experienced individuals tended 
to use a picture of a mirror image more readily when they 
expected to look at a mirror than when they received a 
demonstration indicating that the cue was a static picture. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that apes were sen-
sitive to the correspondence between mirror reflections 
and shadows and their physical referents. This sensitivity 
to the involved optical relations seems to allow apes dis-
criminate between appearance and reality in this context.
There are a number of limitations to the current results. 
In the present set of studies, we tested apes understanding 
of optical relations in a fairly constrained context involv-
ing only few mirror angles and their performance was not 
always very high. Using more interactive and dynamic set-
ups akin to Menzel et al. (1985) might help in the future to 
further explore apes’ ability to make use of these optical 
relations. Furthermore, the two-choice setup with the sub-
jects facing the experimenter always might be susceptible 
to inadvertent cueing (Pfungst 1965), However, we deem 
such Clever-Hans effects unlikely in this case for the fol-
lowing reasons: in the arbitrary control condition (Experi-
ment 2), in which the experimenter gave cues to the apes 
by moving a rubber patch to the correct side of the plat-
form, apes performed at chance. Any inadvertent cues that 
might have been given to the apes were most likely more 
subtle than the cues given in this arbitrary control condi-
tion. Moreover, apes modulated their pointing response 
depending on the distance of the food reward (Experiment 
3). It is unclear how the experimenter would cue the apes 
to modulate their response accordingly (especially because 
we did not administer differential reinforcement for this 
response). Finally, in a pilot experiment with the same 
experimenter and a similar left/right choice apes failed to 
perform above chance. It is unclear why the apes would 
make use of any inadvertent cues in one setup but not the 
other.
Our findings are in line with a number of recent studies in 
which reinforcement learning failed to account for apes’ per-
formance across various different paradigms (see Call 2006). 
In these studies, apes used, for example, the rattling noise 
of a food reward inside a shaken cup (Call 2004), the visual 
trail left by a leaky yogurt cup (Völter and Call 2014), or 
the orientation of a seesaw (Hanus and Call 2008) to locate 
hidden food. In some of these cases, apes performed above 
chance already in their first trial (Hanus and Call 2008; 
Völter and Call 2014) and often no significant improvement 
was found within the administered number of trials. All of 
these findings contrast with arbitrary control conditions in 
which there also was salient and reliable predictor of a food 
reward, which was not causally related to the presence of 
the reward. As in the arbitrary condition of Experiment 2 (in 
which the experimenter moved the rubber patch as a cue), 
apes largely failed to pick up these cues within an equal 
number of trials (Call 2004, 2007; Hanus and Call 2008, 
2011; Völter and Call 2014; for a recent review, see Völter 
and Call 2017). Indeed, reinforcement learning can be sur-
prisingly slow in apes if there is no apparent causal relation 
underpinning the reinforcement regime such as in token 
exchange paradigms (Hanus and Call 2011; Pelé et al. 2009; 
Schrauf and Call 2009). However, when the learning con-
text is altered such that the tokens activate a food dispenser 
(thereby creating the impression of a causal relationship) 
instances of one-trial learning have been reported (Völter 
et al. 2016).
The current findings have implications for apes’ represen-
tational capacities. Using a novel paradigm we confirmed 
here that great apes are capable of appearance-reality dis-
crimination in the context of mirror images. AR discrimina-
tion tasks typically require an individual to memorize the 
real task-relevant relations and to inhibit the misleading 
appearance information similar to Piagetian conservation 
tasks. Indeed, it has been argued that the nonverbal AR dis-
crimination tasks that have been used to date cannot distin-
guish between AR discrimination and Piagetian conservation 
(Karg et al. 2014). Krachun et al. (2016), however, showed 
that even when visual tracking is prevented by shuffling the 
options out of sight, chimpanzees could use the misleading 
appearance to identify the truly larger food quantity. Mirrors 
offer additional possibilities to examine AR discrimination 
beyond conservation abilities. For example, if an individual 
is sensitive to the properties of a mirror, no pre-exposure of 
the real task relations would be necessary, which would rule 
out any Piagetian conservation account by design. In line 
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with this, our results suggest that apes were indeed capable 
of discriminating between the mirror reflection and its ref-
erent without any pre-exposure of the actual food location. 
Indeed, apes’ performance suggest that they did not only 
discriminate between reflection and reflected object but they 
also seemed to infer the geometrical relation between the 
two.
Suddendorf and Whiten (2001) proposed that nonhuman 
great apes, like human children in the second year of life, 
hold secondary representations concurrently with primary 
perceptual representations. These secondary representations 
are decoupled from the perceptual input and might allow 
for the reinterpretation of primary representations (see also 
Karmiloff-Smith 1992). Evidence from diverse areas includ-
ing mirror-induced self-exploration, hidden object displace-
ment tasks, and means-end reasoning supports the claim that 
apes and young children entertain such secondary represen-
tations. Some of the most compelling evidence can be found 
in the literature on picture and scale model recognition. For 
instance, 2-year-old children can use pictures and scale mod-
els of a room to locate a hidden toy in the corresponding 
room after they had observed how an experimenter hid a 
miniature version of the toy in the analogous location of the 
model or picture (e.g., DeLoache 1991, 2000; DeLoache 
and Burns 1994). Likewise, chimpanzees have been shown 
to use a scale model of an enclosure to locate a hidden item 
after observing the hiding of a miniature version of the item 
in the corresponding position of the model (Kuhlmeier and 
Boysen 2001, 2002; Kuhlmeier et al. 1999). These findings 
suggest that young children and chimpanzees can use the 
correspondence relation between a model and its physical 
referent and they seem to use both relational and landmark 
cues to establish the correspondence between the model and 
its referent (DeLoache 1991; Kuhlmeier and Boysen 2002; 
Marzolf et al. 1999).
Our results provide further evidence that great apes enter-
tain secondary representations. Primary perceptual represen-
tations of mirror reflections and shadows alone might lead to 
a misrepresentation of these optical effects. For example, a 
mirror reflection might be confused with its physical referent 
or it might be interpreted as a separate object without any 
relation to the referent. The current findings together with 
previous findings on mirror use in nonhuman primates (e.g., 
Anderson and Gallup 2015; Menzel et al. 1985) suggest that 
at least great apes do not misrepresent mirror reflections 
in this way. Secondary representations might allow apes to 
represent the correspondence between mirror reflections/
shadows and their physical referents.
Finally, our results might have implications for self-
recognition studies. As mentioned before, mirror-induced 
spontaneous self-exploration seems to be a capacity setting 
great apes apart from other primates (e.g., Anderson and 
Gallup 2015). Gorillas who sometimes seem to confuse 
pictures with real objects (Parron et al. 2008) are the only 
great apes species who produced mixed results with regard 
to self-recognition tests. A prerequisite for apes’ self-
directed behaviours might be their causal understanding 
of mirror images as evidenced by the current findings. The 
only study that found self-directed mirror-induced behav-
iours in primates other than great apes used a training 
procedure to establish visual-somatosensory associations 
(Chang et al. 2015). After this training, rhesus macaques 
started to show self-exploratory behaviours such as touch-
ing marks on their face or exploring usually unseen body 
parts by means of a mirror. The reason why such training 
is not necessary for great apes might be that apes are capa-
ble of making inferences about the causes of optical effects 
such as their own mirror image. An interesting avenue 
for future research will be to extend the present work to 
other species, which might show whether the striking dif-
ferences between great apes and other primates evident 
in self-recognition and picture recognition studies can be 
traced back to apes’ inferential reasoning capacity.
In summary, the current study shows that nonhuman 
great apes relate mirror images and shadows to objects 
in the world without confusing their location with the 
location of these objects. Control conditions suggest that 
reinforcement learning alone is insufficient to account for 
these findings. Moreover, apes showed themselves capable 
of locating hidden objects in space based on their mirror 
images. In particular, they could extract depth information 
from the mirror image and predicted the location of hidden 
food based on the orientation of the mirror. These infer-
ences about optical relations may prove to be fundamental 
for apes’ outstanding performance in mirror-induced self-
recognition tasks.
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